



A New Look at the ‘Generic Overgeneralisation’ Effect 
 
ABSTRACT:  
While generic generalisations have been studied by linguists and philosophers for 
decades, they have only recently become the focus of concentrated interest by 
cognitive and developmental psychologists, who propose the generics-as-default view. 
In this paper we focus on the ‘Generic Overgeneralisation’ (GOG) effect (Leslie, 
Khemlani, and Glucksberg 2011) and the native speaker judgments that have been 
used to support it, and by extension, the generics-as-default view. We take a step back 
to look at the history of the GOG effect in order to contextualise it. We review existing 
experimental evidence and discuss four non-mutually exclusive explanations for the 
GOG effect: ignorance, subkind interpretation, atypical behaviour of all and 
quantifier domain restriction. We conclude that a closer look at the semantics and 
pragmatics of generics and universal quantifiers may provide a more nuanced 






In this paper, and in our broader research program, we are investigating the 
similarities and differences between different ways of expressing generalisations in 
natural language. Quantificational generalisations, as in (1), are expressed in 
quantitative, statistical terms, while generic generalisations, as in (2)-(3), make 
general claims about kinds of entities and refer to a property that is characteristic of 
the kind in question, but not necessarily statistically prevalent, as in (3), (only adult, 
male lions have manes). 
 
(1) Some lions live in cages. 
(2) Lions roar. 
(3) Lions have manes. 
 
Generic generalisations have long been studied in formal semantics, within which 
genericity is frequently viewed as a species of quantification. Even though generics 
have been studied since the seventies (see Lawler 1972, 1973; Dahl 1975; Carlson 
1977) they still remain a rather controversial topic when it comes to deciding how to 
characterise their semantic interpretation and how to model their truth conditions (see 
recent discussion in Carlson 2011; Mari, Beyssade, and del Prete 2013). Within 
formal semantics, modal logic and probabilistic approaches are most prominent, both 
of which treat genericity as akin to quantification. According to the modal approach, 
which is the most widely adopted formal analysis of genericity (see Mari, Beyssade, 
and del Prete, 2013, 43), generic meaning is obtained as the effect of an underlying 
operator or quantifier dubbed ‘GEN’, which is not phonologically realised but which 
is active in the composition of the sentence meaning and is an unselective variable 
binding operator similar to adverbs of quantification like usually, typically, always, as 




structure as in (4) (Krifka et al. 1995). Thus, the logical form of (2) may be given as 
follows in (5):1 
 
(4) GEN   [restrictor] [matrix] 
(5) GEN x [Lions (x)] [Roar (x)] 
 
A competing probabilistic account has been developed by Cohen (1999, 2004), 
according to which the important factor is the probability of the individual having the 
property in question. This probabilistic account also relies on a covert generic 
quantifier.2, 3 
Carlson (2011, 1172) argues that “the GEN analysis is both rich and complex, 
interacting with the context, information structure, and subtleties of the syntax in a 
variety of ways. While the details of various analyses that have employed it may be 
called into question, that there is some kind of operator akin to GEN in generics is a 
reasonably secure claim at this point; this, despite the fact that it does not have direct 
and fully consistent morphological/phonetic realization in English or any languages 
that have been studied extensively to date”. 
This quote brings our attention to the fact that no language seems to have an 
overt realisation of the ‘GEN’ operator. Generic generalisations can be made using a 
wide range of different grammatical means, both within, as illustrated for English in 
(6), and across languages (see Behrens [2000] for typological comparisons and 
discussion4), but no language has a unique, unambiguous marker of genericity 
                                                
1 The tripartite structure was introduced by Heim (1982) and Farkas and Sugioka (1983) as a major 
novelty against Carlson’s (1977) unitary operator Gn. A major motivation for the tripartite structure 
implicit in quantification is that it readily accommodates intuitions of ambiguity, such as those 
associated with sentences like “typhoons arise in this part of the Pacific”, which can be interpreted as 
either “typhoons in general have a common origin in this part of the Pacific”, or as “there arise 
typhoons in this part of the Pacific”. See Krifka et al. (1995, 23) for discussion. 
2 Cohen’s probabilistic account proposes that it is probability rather than modality that forms the basis 
of the semantics of generics, at least for ‘absolute generics’ such as ravens are black. This account 
holds that As are B is true just in case the probability of an arbitrary A being a B is greater than 0.5, that 
is, greater than chance. Cohen (2004, 531) introduces a homogeneity condition, according to which 
“the generic gen(ψ,φ) presupposes that its domain, ψ, is homogeneous, in the following sense: for any 
psychologically salient criterion by which ψ may be partitioned into subsets, the conditional probability 
of φ ought to be roughly the same given every such subset of ψ.” Salient partitions are e.g. space, 
numerical scales, gender, subject matter and abstract domains. As Mari, Beyssade, and del Prete (2013; 
84) illustrate, in Cohen (1999), he proposes that there is a covert generic quantifier GEN, which gives 
rise to the following representation:  
i. Birds fly. 
GEN (bird(x), fly(x)) P(fly | bird) > 0.5 (the probability of an object flying given that the 
object is a bird is greater than 0.5) 
3 Within formal semantics, the view that generics are not quantificational is either considered to have 
been surpassed by the modal account (cf. Carlson 1977) or has not yet been shaped into a fully spelled 
out account. See though Deo and Maniman (2015) for an account based on gradability and stochastic 
comparison, as well as discussion in Mari et al. (2013) and further references therein, where they state 
that an account based on noun ambiguity à la Dayal (2004) could provide an account for genericity 
without assuming a generic operator. Within philosophy, the view that generics are not quantificational 
is a common feature of the following proposals: (a) generics are simple subject/predicate sentences that 
predicate properties of kinds (Liebesman 2011), (b) genericity has a psychological, rather than a 
linguistic, basis (Collins 2015) and (c) a sophisticated kind-predicate view à la Carlson (1977) needs to 
be revisited (Teichman 2015). 
4 In languages without articles, such as Finnish, which morphologically conflates referential marking 
and role marking, the morphological case of a phrase might be a relevant feature in generic marking. 




equivalent to a quantifier or determiner. It is important to note that none of the 
analyses that posit a ‘GEN’ operator offer an explanation for this, a point that the 
Generics-as-Default view (see next paragraph) capitalises upon.  
 
(6) a. Echidnas have claws.  bare plural 
b. An echidna has claws.  indefinite singular 
c. The echidna has claws.  definite singular 
 
In contrast to the quantificational analysis of generics, a growing body of 
experimental and developmental psychological work on the topic proposes that 
genericity is categorically different from (and significantly simpler than) 
quantification (Leslie 2007; Gelman 2010). This latter hypothesis, called the 
Generics-as-Default view (GaD view henceforth) treats generics as an innate and 
default mode of thinking. This idea is linked to the view of cognition that assumes 
two different systems, argued for by Kahneman and Frederick (2002) among others, 
which includes a distinction between System 1, a fast, automatic, effortless lower-
level system, and System 2, a slower, more effortful higher-level rule-governed 
system.5 According to this view, the fact that no language has a dedicated overt 
‘GEN’ operator does not come as a surprise: given that generics are the most 
primitive default generalisations, children do not need to learn anything in order to 
acquire them. Thus, generics come essentially for free.  
 Determining which properties or attributes can be generically predicated has 
proven very challenging for both types of approach. Generic generalisations can range 
from exceptionless definitional statements such as triangles have three sides, or the 
walrus is a mammal, through what Leslie, Khemlani, and Glucksberg (2011) call 
‘majority characteristic’ statements such as dogs have four legs or tigers have stripes 
(which are true of the overwhelming majority of instances, with only a few 
exceptional individuals), through ‘minority characteristic’ statements like ducks lay 
eggs or lions have manes (which all involve primary or secondary sexual 
characteristics of animals, and are thus only true of no more than 50% of individuals), 
to ‘striking’ generalisations like sharks attack swimmers, or mosquitoes carry malaria 
(which are true of only a tiny fraction of individuals, but involve properties which are 
noteworthy in some way). 
 To make matters more complicated, not only is statistical prevalence not 
necessary to licence generic generalisations, it is not sufficient either. Statements like 
books are paperbacks or Canadians are right-handed may be true of 80% or more of 
individuals, and yet are not typically judged as true, and thus fail as generic 
statements. 
The two approaches to genericity have their own different challenges. Within 
the formal semantics approach, a critical challenge has been to understand and model 
the ways in which generic generalisations are licensed, and, as just discussed, to 
account for the lack of any overt realisation of ‘GEN’ in any known language. 
                                                                                                                                      
contain classifiers. For further discussion of the typological parameters of genericity see Behrens 
(2000). 
5 The idea that there are two distinct systems of cognition, one of which is intuitive in nature, and one 
of which is reflective has been common across scientists who study human reasoning in different 
domains, i.e. in conditional and probabilistic reasoning (Evans and Over 1996; Sloman 2002; 
Stanovich 1999), decision making (Kahneman and Frederick 2002) and social cognition of various 




In the psychological GaD approach, because generic generalisations are 
understood as a basic mode of thinking, some of the specific challenges for the 
quantificational analysis are avoided. For instance, according to this view, there is no 
overt generic operator in any known language because generics are the unmarked, 
System 1, case. On this view, only effortful, non-default quantificational 
generalisations require overt linguistic exponence. Moreover, the GaD approach fits 
naturally with findings that generics are frequent in children’s natural speech from a 
very early age (Gelman et al. 2008). However, while assigning generics to a more 
basic, unmarked System 1, mode of thinking may sound intuitive at some level, it 
rests on a vague and undefined notion of markedness.6 Moreover, it is not obvious 
that this approach fares any better in offering a principled explanation for why 
Italians are good skiers is typically judged as true (and thus an acceptable generic 
statement), while Canadians are right-handed is not. 
In Lazaridou-Chatzigoga, Katsos and Stockall (2015), we juxtapose the formal 
semantic and the psychological approaches and in doing so we highlight some of the 
significant challenges for each of them. We argue that the evidence for the GaD 
proposal is significantly weakened by a lack of cross-linguistic considerations and 
serious engagement with the formal semantics of quantification and specificity. We 
also question the appeal to effortful processing much of the evidence for the proposal 
rests on. On the other hand, the formal semantics models do not offer any explanation 
for the robust findings from early child language competence, namely that generic 
utterances and generic interpretations are present in children as young as 2 years old, 
despite not being associated with any overt morpho-syntactic marker in any known 
language.  
In this paper we will focus on the effect called ‘Generic Overgeneralisation’ 
(GOG) (Leslie, Khemlani, and Glucksberg 2011), which has been used to support the 
GaD view on generics. We will take a step back to look at the history of the GOG 
effect in order to understand it better. We will use conceptual arguments, as well as 
discuss a set of four alternative explanations for the data that seem to support GOG: a) 
ignorance of the relevant facts, b) subkind (taxonomic) interpretation, c) the atypical 
behaviour of all and d) Quantifier Domain Restriction (QDR). We will propose that 
all these factors play a role in explaining the attested behaviour by adults. These 
factors are independently attested and known to interact with the interpretation of 
generic and quantified statements. We will propose that they likely suffice to explain 
the data that have been used to justify the existence of the GOG effect. We suggest 
that even the name of the GOG effect might be misleading. The effect mainly tries to 
capture the behaviour observed with the quantifier all, which supposedly gets a 
generic interpretation as a result of an overgeneralisation bias. Thus, perhaps a better 
name for that effect would be ‘Quantifier Reanalysis’ effect, because this term would 
direct the focus where we believe it belongs: on the interpretation of all, or more 
generally of quantifiers, rather than the interpretation of generic statements. The 
overall aim is to showcase the role of linguistic factors (both semantic and pragmatic) 
in the interpretation of generic and quantified statements, and to underscore the 
relevance of linguistically-motivated explanations.  
                                                
6 While it may be intuitive to say that ducks lay eggs is simpler, and therefore less marked, than all 
ducks lay eggs, no such easy comparison can be made between the generic an echidna lays eggs and 
the specific indefinite an echidna lives here. The appeal to markedness in the GaD literature seems to 
rely heavily on the fact that many generic statements in English involve a bare plural subject combined 
with a simple present verb form. A significantly more sophisticated notion of markedness will be 




2 A history of the Generic Overgeneralisation effect 
 
In this section we will review the Generic Overgeneralisation effect, given that it has 
been adduced as one of the main predictions and, subsequently, as one of the main 
pieces of evidence in support of the GaD view. 
Leslie, Khemlani, and Glucksberg (2011) use GOG to refer to “the tendency to 
overgeneralise the truth of a generic to the truth of the corresponding universal 
statement” (17). In order to understand the importance of this effect, we propose to 
look at the reasoning behind it: if we assume that generics invoke the cognitive 
system’s default mode of generalisation, Leslie (2008, 23) claims that “we might 
further conjecture that the comprehension of non-default quantifiers requires the 
conceptual system to override or inhibit its default operations”. If generics are the 
default interpretation of any generalisation, then understanding quantified statements 
requires deviating from the default interpretation. Thus, it is more effortful. Both 
children and adults might sometimes fail to perform this deviation and thus, despite 
knowing how to correctly interpret quantified statements in most cases, they would 
occasionally “treat them as if they were generics” (Leslie 2007, 398).  
Leslie (2008) argues that generalising with generics follows a default process, 
whereas generalising with quantifiers follows a non-default process. She compares 
these processes to the default processes that a chicken’s spinal column implements, 
which triggers basic locomotion (evident in headless chickens that are nevertheless 
able to run), vs. the non-default processes of its brain that inhibit/manage such 
behaviour in the usual circumstances. Other examples of (non)default processes 
which Leslie (2008) points out as models for the GaD can be found in areas such as 
cellular processes, neural networks, glandular regulatory systems, visual cognition, 
action-planning systems, and even at the conscious level of temptation resistance.  
Leslie’s view of the difference between generics vs. quantifiers is argued to be 
very similar to Kahnemanian System 1 vs. System 2 distinctions. One piece of 
evidence for the existence of two systems is the fact that they can lead to conflicting 
judgments. Conflicts can arise between what people judge on an intuitive basis and 
what people judge on a reflective basis. When there is a conflict, this might result in 
fast, automatic System 1 responses, when slower, more effortful System 2 responses 
are required. The distinction is thus between ‘intuitive System 1’ and ‘reflective 
System 2’.  
Research has demonstrated experimentally that in situations where intuition and 
reflection diverge, participants arrive at conflicting judgments, one issued by System 
1 and the other by System 2 (see Frederick [2005]). This can occur when people are 
given a task that requires a System 2 operation and response, but instead they give a 
System 1 response that is easier, quicker and more automatic. Thus, System 1 is 
erroneously over-used.  
Leslie (2007, 395) cites Frederick’s (2005) “cognitive reflection test”, to 
illustrate the idea that the two systems might arrive at conflicting judgments: “A bat 
and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1 more than the ball. How much does the 
ball cost?” Most people report an initial inclination to answer “10 cents”. System 1 
supplies this first fast, but erroneous response. The correct response of “5 cents” 
requires algebraic reasoning, part of the slower System 2. 
Thus, the idea is that we might find experimental situations where we would see 
evidence of a similar type of error for making and understanding generalisations, 
which emerges when people rely on the default process instead of the non-default. 




Errors then would arise when “people interpret quantified statements as though they 
were generics” (Leslie 2007, 398). 
If we accept that generics reflect this default mode of generalisation while other 
methods require inhibitory processing, one expects some empirical consequences, 
Leslie argues. The list of the ones envisaged (Leslie 2008, 24-25) includes: 
 
a) children are expected to produce and comprehend generics with greater 
ease than quantifiers, and at earlier ages 
b) generics are expected to show up more frequently in maternal speech 
than quantifiers 
c) if faced with a “sufficiently demanding cognitive task, young children 
might even erroneously interpret sentences containing explicit 
quantifiers as though they were generics” 
d) we might also expect adults to be susceptible to the same type of error 
and treat nongeneric generalisations, as if they were generics, i.e. 
“nongeneric generalisations would, from time to time, inappropriately 
exhibit some characteristics of generics, especially if the information-
processing demands were made great enough”  
 
We will discuss here the third and fourth predictions, but see Lazaridou-Chatzigoga, 
Katsos and Stockall (2015) for a review of the developmental studies concerning 
points (a) and (b) above.7 
Research by Hollander, Gelman and Star (2002) has been argued to show this 
effect for children, thus providing evidence for prediction (c). In experiment 1 they 
asked 3- and 4-year-old children and adults to answer questions like Are {fires/all 
fires/some fires} hot? They found that while both 3- and 4-year-olds gave adult-like 
responses to generic questions, only the 4-year-olds were adult-like with all and some 
questions. The 3-year-olds answered all three question types following the same 
pattern. Crucially, this response pattern was the one observed for generics for both 4-
year-olds and adults. Thus, given that 3-year-olds gave to all and some the same 
response pattern as to generics, the authors conclude that they treated quantified 
sentences as if they were generic, as predicted by the GaD hypothesis. This is not due 
though to children’s poor understanding of quantifiers in general, they argue, as 3-
year-olds understand quantifiers in a less demanding task (experiment 2). Experiment 
1 was more demanding because it asked children to think about abstract generalities 
rather than about a restricted set that was readily available. 
Leslie (2008) argues that, even though Hollander, Gelman and Star (2002) did 
not find a similar error with their adult participants, adults may still be susceptible to 
similar errors under certain circumstances. Thus, in order to test prediction (d) above, 
Khemlani, Leslie, Glucksberg, and Rubio-Fernández (2007) tested a larger set of data 
than the one used in Hollander, Gelman and Star (2002). More specifically, 
participants were presented with minority characteristic statements such as (all) ducks 
lay eggs and (all) horses give live birth and were asked whether they agreed with the 
                                                
7 One reviewer points out the “natural pedagogy” theory proposed by Csibra and Gergely’s (2009) as 
potentially relevant for the data in question. This theory suggests that infants fast-learn generic 
knowledge from adults positing a “genericity bias”. We will leave this discussion for future work given 
that (a) the acquisition of generics falls outside the main focus of the present paper, and (b) due to 
space limitations, as the “natural pedagogy” theory is not purely linguistic, but rather aims at providing 
a framework for cultural transmission and communication more broadly, the relevance of which would 




statement or not. According to the authors, participants should reject the all-
statements, because they are false. Nevertheless, participants agreed to the all-
statements approximately half of the time (46%), which the authors take to provide 
preliminary evidence for a GOG effect in adults. 
The first detailed investigation of the GOG effect is found in Leslie, Khemlani, 
and Glucksberg (2011). In their experiment 1, participants judged the truth or falsity 
of a list of generic and all-quantified statements that were presented one after the 
other without any background context. In more than half of the trials when the all-
statements involved characteristic properties, participants judged these statements to 
be true: 78% for majority characteristic such as all tigers have stripes and 51% for 
minority characteristic statements such as all ducks lay eggs. By contrast, all-
statements, which did not involve characteristic properties, such as all cars have 
radios, were only judged true 13% of the time. The authors argue that these high 
acceptance rates for the characteristic-property all-statements are due to participants 
interpreting the ‘false’ universally quantified statements as if they were their ‘true’ 
generic counterparts, and are thus a clear case of GOG. 
As the authors acknowledge, however, these elevated acceptance rates might be 
due to alternative explanations, which they sought to address in subsequent 
experiments. Leslie, Khemlani, and Glucksberg (2011) considered three possible 
explanations for why their participants were so prone to accept statements like all 
ducks lay eggs as true: a) ignorance of the relevant facts, b) a subkind (taxonomic) 
interpretation of all, and c) quantifier domain restriction. 
 
a. Ignorance of the relevant facts 
 
The simplest explanation for the behaviour of the participants in Leslie, Khemlani, 
and Glucksberg’s (2011) experiment 1 is that they simply didn’t know some of the 
relevant facts. All the items in the majority and minority characteristic conditions 
involved properties of animals, and many of these properties involved primary or 
secondary sexual characteristics relevant to mating and reproduction. If participants 
were ignorant, they might have accepted all ducks lay eggs because they actually 
thought that all ducks, including males, do so. 
The authors addressed this possibility with experiment 3, which included two 
different tasks: (a) the truth value judgment task as in experiment 1 and (b) a 
knowledge task, in which they asked participants to judge the truth or falsity of false 
gendered minority characteristic statements such as male ducks lay eggs or female 
lions have manes. The authors manipulated whether participants did the knowledge 
task before or after the truth value judgment task. They found that participants were 
generally aware of the relevant facts (rejecting the false statements 84% of the time). 
When the knowledge task followed the truth value judgment task, the results from 
experiment 1 were replicated: both minority and majority characteristic all-statements 
were judged true more than 50% of the time (70% for majority and 50% for 
minority). The knowledge task results show that even participants who know the facts 
still produced the GOG effect. And even when the knowledge task preceded the truth 
value judgment task, which ensured that the relevant facts were salient, participants 
still accepted majority characteristic statements such as all tigers have stripes 90% of 
the time, and minority characteristic items (all lions have manes) 32% of the time. 
They conclude that the GOG effect cannot be attributed to ignorance, and appears to 





b. Subkind (taxonomic) interpretation 
 
If we take sentences like all tigers have stripes or all ducks lay eggs to quantify over 
tiger or duck subkinds, all tigers have stripes could be interpreted as ‘all kinds/types 
of tigers have stripes’, including the Bengal tiger, the Sumatran tiger, the Siberian 
tiger, etc. and all ducks lay eggs could be interpreted as ‘all kinds/types of ducks lay 
eggs’, including the Mallard, the Eider, the Goldeneye, etc. Under such a subkind or 
taxonomic interpretation, the correct response to these statements is to accept them. 
Thus participants in the truth value judgment task in experiment 1 may have been 
generating subkind interpretations on the trials they judged to be true.8 
In order to address this alternative explanation, the authors ran experiment 2b, 
where participants followed the truth value judgment task with an additional second 
phase, in which they were asked to provide paraphrases of each statement they had 
judged in the first phase. The authors then coded the responses and looked for 
mentions of subtypes, finding that only 1% of the paraphrases included subtyping 
language. These results lead them to reject the possibility that subkind interpretation 
was driving the participants’ behaviour. 
 
c. Quantifier Domain Restriction (QDR)  
 
A sentence like all ducks lay eggs might be judged as true, if people interpret it as 
applying to only a relevant subset of ducks, namely to the mature fertile female ducks. 
This explanation takes quantified statements to be interpreted within a context, which 
may restrict the scope of the quantifier (as per Stanley and Szabó 2000, Stanley 
2002). Thus, the reason why people accept the above statement is because (they 
believe) it is true once you have restricted the quantifier to the relevant subset of 
ducks. 
In order to address this alternative explanation the authors ran experiment 2a, 
where they provided the participants with a background context, which was presented 
before each statement. These contexts included artificial population estimates of the 
following form:  
 
(7) ‘‘Suppose the following is true: there are 431 million ducks in the world. 
Do you agree with the following: all ducks lay eggs.’ 
 
This information was supposed to prime quantification over every individual duck in 
the world, and thereby to make it difficult/impossible to interpret all as restricted to 
only the (female) ducks that are presupposed by lay eggs. If acceptance of all ducks 
lay eggs in the first experiment was driven by QDR, the authors predicted that it 
would disappear in the context of population information. 
Nevertheless, the GOG effect still occurred on a substantial portion of trials, 
with a 60% acceptance rate for all statements for majority characteristic statements 
and 30% for minority characteristic statements - less than when the statements 
appeared with no preceding context (78% and 51% respectively), but still a high 
                                                
8 In further support for this explanation note that the generalisations used in the majority non-
characteristic, and striking conditions, which were almost always rejected in their all-statement form, 
are less susceptible to a subkind or taxonomic interpretation. A ‘striking’ statement such as all pit bulls 
maul children does not easily have the interpretation ‘all kinds/subtypes of pit bulls maul children’, nor 
does a majority non-characteristic statement such as all clocks are round (‘all subtypes/kinds of clocks 




percentage. The authors thus concluded that quantifier domain restriction could not be 
the sole explanation for the GOG effect. 
 
On the basis of the results of the additional experiments that addressed the three 
alternative explanations for the acceptance of all-statements with majority and 
minority characteristic statements, Leslie, Khemlani, and Glucksberg (2011) rejected 
all of them and argued to have found support for a strong generic bias, according to 
which people sometimes treat universally quantified statements as if they were 
generic.  
 
3 Alternative explanations for the GOG effect 
 
In this section we articulate the reasons we believe that the rejection of the alternative 
explanations by Leslie, Khemlani, and Glucksberg (2011) was premature, and that 
these options, together with a fourth option they do not consider (atypical behaviour 
of all), are plausible explanations for the putative GOG effect. We will argue, then, 
that the GOG effect is not due to participant error based on the erroneous 
overgeneralisation of generic readings to universally quantified statements, but rather 
a perfectly reasonable response given the semantics and pragmatics of quantification.  
 We briefly revisit the ignorance explanation, and then discuss subkind 
interpretations and the atypical behaviour of all. We will discuss the fourth possible 
alternative explanation, quantifier domain restriction, in its own section, to do proper 
justice to the nature of the explanation. 
 
a. Ignorance/Failure to recall the relevant facts 
 
We are persuaded by Leslie, Khemlani, and Glucksberg’s (2011) experiment 3 that 
their participants know the relevant facts about the minority characteristic items (all 
ducks lay eggs, all deer have antlers), and we accept that the 30% acceptance rates for 
such sentences even when the knowledge probing task came first means that general 
or temporary ‘ignorance’ (failure to remember) cannot entirely explain the GOG 
effect. However, making the exceptions salient does reduce acceptance rates for these 
items by 18%, suggesting failure to recall the facts does play some role in generating 
‘true’ responses to these items.  
Furthermore, the knowledge task and task order manipulation (knowledge task 
before or after the truth value judgment task) produce very puzzling results for the 
majority characteristic items (tigers have stripes). The knowledge task included only 
false minority characteristic statements like male ducks lay eggs and thus it failed to 
test whether participants are aware that majority characteristic generalisations also 
have exceptions (participants were not asked to judge whether albino tigers have 
stripes or amputated horses have four legs). Doing the knowledge task (which as we 
noted included only minority characteristic statements) before the critical truth value 
judgment task had an effect on majority characteristic statements too. In fact, it 
increased acceptance rates for majority characteristic all-statements by 20% 
compared to doing this task after the judgment (acceptance increased from 70% to 
90%). This is counter-intuitive, because for minority characteristic statements the 
knowledge task had the effect of decreasing acceptances (and hence decreasing the 
putative GOG effect). Leslie and colleagues appeal to a strategic task effect to explain 
this strange result, but they do not provide convincing evidence that participants in the 




Thus, experiment 3 showed that participants accepted minority characteristic 
items 18% less of the time when they did the knowledge task first (acceptance 
dropped from 50% to 32%). Therefore, it could be argued that 18% of the GOG effect 
is explained by ignorance/failure to recall but a remaining 32% of acceptances should 
be safely attributed to GOG. However, the fact that acceptance rates went up for 
majority characteristic statements when the knowledge task preceded the experiment 
suggests that something else is going on apart from ignorance/failure to recall. We 
believe that this is the atypical behaviour of all, which we outline in section (c) below.  
 
b. Subkind (taxonomic) interpretation 
 
The paraphrase task used by Leslie, Khemlani, and Glucksberg (2011) does not 
provide conclusive evidence to exclude the subkind interpretation explanation. The 
distinction between implicit knowledge and explicit knowledge is one of the most 
fundamental distinctions in cognitive science (see Dienes and Perner [2002] for an 
overview of cases where participants are employing rules in categorisation and 
judgment tasks that they are not able to report in explicit versions of the task). In our 
context, participants may not have been sufficiently consciously aware that they were 
interpreting all ducks as ‘all kinds of duck’ in the main experiment to be able to 
explicitly report this in a paraphrase task that was administered later on, but this does 
not guarantee that they did not do so. Thus, we cannot rule out the possibility that at 
least some of the times when people accept a statement like all ducks lay eggs, they 
are interpreting it as quantifying over different duck subkinds, such as the Mallard, 
the Eider, the Goldeneye, etc., which renders the universal statements trivially true.  
 
c. Atypical behaviour of all  
 
When Leslie, Khemlani, and Glucksberg (2011) discuss the GOG effect, they reason 
that it would be unlikely that adults would make such errors with some, whereas data 
from Hollander, Gelman and Star (2002) suggest that 3-year-olds make similar errors 
with both some and all. The authors hypothesise that adults might be inclined to do so 
only with universal statements given that “it may be harder, […] to confirm that a 
universal statement is true” (Leslie, Khemlani, and Glucksberg 2011, 17). Thus, 
Leslie and colleagues decided to focus on the universal quantifier all. In this 
subsection we will review some factors that suggest that all cannot be treated as a 
representative universal quantifier, couching these within a broader consideration of 
the behaviour of all. It might be then that the GOG effect is due more to the atypical 
behaviour of all rather than to the default nature of generic readings.  
First, the behaviour of all has been discussed in work that investigates fallacious 
reasoning (Jönsson and Hampton 2006). All has been found to participate in a special 
phenomenon called the “inverse conjunction fallacy”, according to which participants 
often expressed a belief in all-statements with a simple restrictor such as all ravens 
are black, while rejecting a matched statement with a conjoined restrictor such as all 
young jungle ravens are black, or, even when they accepted both statements, they 
were inclined to give greater confidence to the first one. These judgments are 
erroneous from the point of view of logic, given that the first statement entails the 
second. If one accepts the first statement, one should also accept the second, and if 
one accepts both, it would be inconsistent to express greater confidence only in one of 
them. Jönsson and Hampton (2006, 323) propose that one of the interpretations of 




universal quantifier in logic”. Results such as these suggest that if people are not 
forced to interpret all strictly, they might interpret it loosely or vaguely, akin to 
‘almost all’. 
Second, the behaviour of all has been discussed in corpus linguistics, in work 
that investigates the expression of exaggeration. Claridge (2011) argues that universal 
quantifiers such as all and every(thing) are prone to hyperbolic use, with a meaning 
similar to ‘very many’ or ‘almost all’. To illustrate this use, she quotes the fragment “I 
didn’t bring none of my clothes back … I left ’em all down there” from Labov (1984) 
and argues that it is clear from the context that the speaker is unlikely to intend the 
statement in its strict literal sense. All in this context gets a more reasonable 
interpretation, according to which it means ‘almost all (my clothes)’ plus intensity. 
Thus, it is possible that participants in the experiments we are reviewing here 
might not have a reason to interpret all tigers have stripes as if speaking strictly. 
Furthermore, given that they know that universal quantifiers are hyperbole-prone, 
they might interpret it as ‘almost all/very many tigers have stripes’ and thus judge it 
as true even though they are aware of the existence of albino tigers. 
A further issue with all is that it is distinct from other English universal 
quantifiers like every and each, in terms of the property of ‘distributivity’. At first 
glance, it might seem, for instance, that (8) and (9) mean the same thing. However, 
while every requires a singular nominal restrictor (cf. *Every girls run), all requires a 
plural (cf. *All girl run), and in episodic sentences all must always appear with a 
definite plural, as in (11), while every again requires a bare singular (12). This 
morpho-syntactic difference can be explained if we assume that all operates over 
plural sets/collectivities, while every operates over atomic individuals/singleton sets. 
Further support for this distinction comes from the fact that every forces a distributive 
interpretation, as in (13), while all allows for a collective interpretation, as in (14). As 
a consequence, all is compatible with collective predicates such as gather, as in (15), 
while every is not, as in (16) (see Beghelli and Stowell 1997 for further discussion). 
 
(8) Every girl runs. 
(9) All girls run. 
(10) Every girl was running. 
(11) All *(the) girls were running. 
(12) Every (*the) girl(*s) was/(*were) running. 
(13) Every girl built a raft. 
(i) different raft for each girl 
(ii) *a single raft built as a team 
(14) All the girls built a raft. 
(i) different raft for each girl 
(ii) a single raft built as a team 
(15) All the girls gathered in the pool. 
(16) *Every girl gathered in the pool. 
 
Thus, all is not only potentially ambiguous between logical ‘all’ and 
conventional/hyperbolic ‘almost all’, all is also ambiguous between distributive and 
collective interpretations. A collective interpretation of all ducks lay eggs could be 
that ‘ducks, collectively/as a set, lay eggs’, which is similar to the kind reading 
‘ducks, as a kind, lay eggs’. This is true, providing yet another alternative route to an 
apparent GOG response. 




one wishes to study the GOG effect – there are several reasons to doubt that it is 
reliably and consistently interpreted as ∀, independently of any possible tendency to 
interpret universals as generics. 
It is clear from the above comparison between different universal quantifiers 
that any general claim about the tendency of universal quantifiers to be interpreted as 
if they were generic cannot overlook variation in the realisation of universally 
quantified statements within a language. Thus, experiments that compare generic and 
different types of universally quantified statements such as all the, every or each need 
to be done (see Lazaridou-Chatzigoga and Stockall 2013 for the first experiment that 
addresses this challenge). Additionally, as will be discussed more in detail in section 
4.2, the different sensitivity universal quantifiers show to quantifier domain restriction 
might prove crucial in order to understand the purported GOG effect. 
 We have argued that ignorance, subkind interpretations, and the atypical 
behaviour of all may each contribute significantly to explaining why participants 
judge statements like all tigers have stripes to be true in Leslie, Khemlani, and 
Glucksberg’s (2011) experiments, without needing any appeal to a Generics-as-
Default explanation. The fourth possible alternative explanation, Quantifier Domain 
Restriction, is more complicated than the others and merits its own section. 
 
4 Quantifier Domain Restriction as an explanation for the GOG effect 
 
4.1 What is Quantifier Domain Restriction 
 
In this section we will focus on Quantifier Domain Restriction (QDR henceforth) and 
whether it can explain these unexpected results about the behaviour of all that Leslie, 
Khemlani, and Glucksberg (2011) have used to support the GaD view on generics. An 
approach that relies on QDR has the additional advantage of accounting for the 
psychological data without postulating ad-hoc mechanisms just for generics.  
We argue that the rejection of the QDR explanation by Leslie and colleagues 
was not justified. Specifically, merely providing participants with population 
estimates is not enough to make QDR to only the relevant (potentially egg-laying) 
ducks impossible, and may even serve to make this subset interpretation salient by 
priming a ‘biology class’ mode of thinking.9 Thus, we think it is quite plausible that 
when people accept a statement like all ducks lay eggs they interpret it as a claim only 
about the relevant restricted set of mature fertile female ducks.  
QDR is a pervasive phenomenon affecting quantifiers and their interpretation 
within a context, and is routinely invoked in quantification (Heim 1991). According 
to QDR, the domain of a quantifier can be restricted in the following sense: everyone 
in (17) does not quantify over all the individuals in the world, but rather over a 
contextually restricted set of individuals, i.e. the dinner guests who had rhubarb pie 
for dessert (example modified from von Fintel [1994, 33]). Furthermore, listeners are 
known to be charitable (Grice 1975). Thus, in a conversation one assumes that 
speakers take the most sensible positions and make the most plausible assertions. 
Under this view, interpreting everyone as quantifying over all the individuals in the 
world seems a rather unlikely intended interpretation and moreover one that is not 
charitable to the speaker because it renders her utterance false, whereas interpreting 
                                                
9 Leslie et al. (2011) do not provide a complete set of materials, only the example of a context and 
generalising statement pair we give in (7) above, so we can only speculate about the extent to which 




everyone with respect to the available set of individuals is not only plausible but also 
charitable to the speaker. 
 
(17) There was rhubarb pie for dessert. Everyone developed a rash. 
    
How we encode QDR in the grammar is currently under debate and opinions vary as 
to whether QDR is part of the syntax/semantics or not, and, if yes, where exactly we 
should place the covert domain variables, on the nominal (Stanley and Szabó 2000; 
Stanley 2002) or on the quantifier (von Fintel 1994; Martí 2003; Giannakidou 2004). 
One execution of the approach that represents contextual variables at LF (Stanley and 
Szabó 2000) argues, for instance, that the nominal argument of every in (18), in this 
case lion, is contextually restricted by an unpronounced domain restriction variable [i] 
which is present in the logical form. Other approaches propose that unarticulated 
constituents of this sort can be supplied by the pragmatic process of free enrichment 
(Recanati 2002; Hall 2008) and need not be postulated in the logical form. Finally, 
another line of proposals follows a situation-based view of domain restriction (Cooper 
1995; Recanati 1996; Schwarz 2012; Kratzer 2004), according to which situation 
arguments, rather than covert domain variables, are responsible for domain restriction.  
 
(18) Context: There are lions and tigers in this cage. 
Every lion[i] is dangerous. 
 
Arguably, this is not the place to decide upon this issue (see Kratzer [2004] for an 
overview). Irrespective of whether one represents QDR as a syntactic, semantic or 
pragmatic phenomenon, there is an abundance of independent motivation for its 
existence. 
If we take seriously the possibility of QDR as an alternative explanation to 
GOG, then participants who accept universally quantified statements like all ducks 
lay eggs are not interpreting them as generic. Instead they are simply engaging with 
the process of QDR, which is naturally implicated in the interpretation of universally 
quantified statements in any case. The following thought experiment spells out this 
alternative in detail. 
 
4.2 A thought experiment involving QDR 
 
If we could show that the amount of ‘GOG’ behaviour can be altered by carefully 
manipulating different levels of contextual information preceding the critical 
utterance, we would have evidence that what is at play is QDR and not GOG. 
Including quantifiers with different sensitivity to QDR would further sharpen the 
predictions and make potential results stronger.  
Rather than the population statistics contexts used by Leslie, Khemlani, and 
Glucksberg (2011), which did not seem to have any (big) effect on participant 
behaviour, we suggest using contexts that make the relevant domain for QDR salient. 
To fully test the effect of such contexts, one could vary the type of contextual 
information preceding the critical utterance as follows: a) neutral, where the 
information in the context does not interact with the truth value of the critical 
statement; b) contradictory, where an exception which should rule out a universally 
quantified statement is made salient, and c) supportive, where the generality of the 




In addition to manipulating context, however, a compelling test of the QDR 
view would also require comparing all (which allows, but does not require QDR) to 
other universal quantifiers like all the and each (which require it because of their 
semantics). 
An illustration of the three levels of context for a majority characteristic 
property in a universally quantified statement is given below:  
 
(19)  
a. neutral context: 
Linton Zoo is home to three tigers, Tibor, Baginda and Kaytlin, whose playful 
games visitors love to watch and photograph. 
b. contradictory context: 
Linton Zoo is home to three tigers, Tibor, Baginda and Kaytlin, whose fur is 
all white due to a recessive gene that controls coat color. 
c. supportive context: 
Linton Zoo is home to three tigers, Tibor, Baginda and Kaytlin, whose black 
and orange coats visitors love to photograph. 
 
Statement:  
All tigers have stripes./All the tigers have stripes./Each tiger has stripes. 
 
On the GaD view, all three contexts should give rise to similar levels of GOG 
responses, for all three quantifiers. The ‘more marked’ system 2 quantified statements 
should be ‘erroneously’ interpreted as generic statements at similar rates to previous 
experiments (somewhere between 30% and 90% of the time). The contradictory 
context may act like the knowledge probe task in Leslie, Khemlani, and Glucksberg’s  
(2011) experiment 3, and reduce acceptance rates for quantified statements by 15%-
20%, but proponents of the GaD view would have no reason to expect a difference 
between the neutral and supportive contexts, or between different quantifiers, since 
the GaD view is that participants fail to interpret the quantifiers as universal 
quantifiers, and that the generic statement counterparts (tigers have stripes) should be 
judged as true in all three contexts.  
The predictions of the QDR account, though, critically diverge from the GaD 
view with respect to the different universal quantifiers, since we predict variation in 
different contexts because of a range of different reasons for participants to offer a 
‘true’ response. We expect that participants’ responses are not biased towards a 
generic interpretation, but are rather dependent on the sensitivity of the quantifier to 
QDR and the availability of kind level interpretation.10  
More specifically, QDR is less likely if the universally quantified statement 
used does not require linking with a set under discussion, as is the case with all, 
compared to each and all the, which do (Partee 1995). For instance, the QDR view 
would predict that providing a context in which the existence of tigers that do not 
have stripes is asserted (the contradictory context) should evoke very low acceptance 
rates for all the and each statements, while all-statements could still trigger relatively 
high acceptance rates. Participants are required to interpret the discourse-linked (D-
linked, as in Pesetsky [1987]) quantifiers as referring to the stripeless tigers just 
                                                
10 Another potential licensor of a ‘true’ response, which we do not discuss here due to space 
limitations, is the availability of a prototypical interpretation. According to this interpretation, all tigers 
have stripes might be judged as true, because the prototype of the concept TIGER is strongly 




introduced in the context – if we observed GOG-like responses to these items in 
contradictory contexts, we would have a reason to reject the QDR explanation and 
accept that participants might be erroneously interpreting quantified statements as 
generics. With all-statements, however, participants could adopt a QDR 
interpretation, but they are not required to. They could alternatively generate any of 
the other options discussed above (kind-level interpretation, loose/hyperbolic 
interpretation), which would licence a ‘true’ response. They could not, however, be 
ignorant of the existence of stripeless tigers, so we would still predict that acceptance 
rates would be lower in the contradictory context than in the neutral or supportive 
contexts. 
Supportive contexts should evoke the mirror pattern for all the and each: 
explicitly predicating variegated coloration of the tigers under discussion means that 
the only licit judgment to these statements would be ‘true’. The difference between 
these quantifiers and the all-statements may be minimal in supportive contexts, 
however, given that the QDR interpretation is easily available, and charitable, and that 
the non-QDR alternatives also licence a ‘true’ response. 
The neutral context would provide a baseline to observe effects of differences 
between quantifier types, while keeping the information supplied by QDR constant. 
To judge whether all the or each statements are true in the neutral context, 
participants will be required to access their own knowledge about the kind under 
discussion; ‘true’ answers will be due to ignorance of/failure to recall the facts. The 
all statements in the neutral contexts could evoke a ‘true’ response for any of the 
reasons discussed above (ignorance, kind interpretation, loose/hyperbolic 
interpretation). 
By using this careful manipulation of context, one could aim to show that 
people interpret generic and universally quantified statements relying on their 
knowledge of the semantics and pragmatics of genericity, quantification and on their 
availability for a contextually restricted interpretation (see Lazaridou-Chatzigoga and 
Stockall [2013] for preliminary support for such manipulations, as well as Lazaridou-
Chatzigoga, Katsos and Stockall [2016] for an implementation of this thought 
experiment).11 
 We have made a strong case for the view that QDR is one of the four non-
mutually exclusive explanations for the behaviour that looks like a ‘GOG’ effect and 
we have outlined how one could further investigate such a claim. In the next section 
we revisit, and question, the argument that the observed GOG effect is what we would 
expect given the GaD. 
 
5 Cognitive load and processing demand 
 
In this section we would like to turn to yet another argument addressing the status of 
the GOG effect. Given that the GOG effect describes the tendency to interpret false 
                                                
11 Manipulating context might additionally illuminate the relevance of QDR for generics themselves, 
something that seems to go against the received view for generics (Krifka 1987), but is in line with 
more recent work, according to which generics display some context sensitivity (Sterken [2015], see 
also discussions in Greenberg [2007] and Carlson [1999]). In Lazaridou-Chatzigoga and Stockall 
(2013) we found that minority characteristic generics like ducks lay eggs preceded by a contradictory 
context that made specific male ducks salient, pattern with all-statements in eliciting very slow truth 
value judgments, as compared to all the or every statements. These results suggest that participants 
might engage in a costly process of domain restriction even with generics. However, this pilot study 
did not manipulate enough features of the context to be conclusive, so more research is needed in order 




universals as the corresponding true generics, the GOG is treated as an erroneous 
judgment people make. Furthermore, it is argued that the GOG is more likely to be 
observed in situations of cognitive load and processing demand. As will be shown 
here, actual evidence that GOG ‘errors’ are more likely to occur due to higher 
cognitive demand is rather sparse. 
In the case of Hollander, Gelman and Star’s (2002) acquisition data, we might 
accept that generalising about abstract entities is more cognitively demanding than 
generalising over a specific set that is readily available. However, it is not clear what 
is so cognitively demanding in the majority of the other experiments reported in the 
literature that claim to show GOG errors with adults. These data mainly concern adult 
native speakers who participate in truth value judgment tasks, who are all competent 
both with generics and quantifiers. 
For example, Leslie, Khemlani, and Glucksberg’s (2011) experiment 1 was 
administered via the Amazon Mechanical Turk online data collection platform, which 
allows participants to complete questionnaires for payment, from the comfort of their 
own home or office. Participants were required to read simple sentences such as ducks 
lay eggs, and select a button labelled ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to indicate whether they agreed 
with the statement. Participants were not required to respond within any particular 
time frame, and were not required to engage in any other task at the same time. 
Participants each judged 132 items in total and they likely spent anywhere from 15-30 
minutes depending on how quickly they worked through the task.12 
These non-obviously demanding tasks resulted in very high rates of apparent 
GOG: “Participants were prone to the GOG effect for minority characteristic and 
majority characteristic predications: universally quantified minority characteristic 
predications were judged true 51% of the time and principled predications were 
judged true 78% of the time when, in fact, all of those statements were false” (Leslie, 
Khemlani, and Glucksberg 2011, 21). 
It is not clear to us that a 78% error rate in response to a very simple task is 
consistent with the hypothesis that the GOG effect should occur “from time to time” 
(Leslie 2008, 25), especially when this rate varies by condition, while the task 
remains the same.   
But more generally, in order to convincingly claim that a task like this is 
cognitively demanding and that this is the reason why the processing load is high 
enough so that GOG errors are more likely to be observed, one needs to actively 
manipulate this dimension. This has simply not been done in the vast majority of the 
experiments that claim to show the GOG effect. There is nothing prima facie 
challenging about the tasks the participants were faced with, and, no evidence that 
higher than normal cognitive demands played any role in generating the high levels of 
acceptance of ‘false’ quantified statements. It is beyond the scope of the current paper 
to review the enormous literature on cognitive load, working memory, individual 
differences, manipulated task demands etc. that are relevant to this issue. Interested 
readers may find Lewis, Vasishth and Van Dyke’s (2006) review a useful starting 
place.  
It suffices to mention just one relevant, highly influential result from decades 
old research on relative clause processing. King and Just (1991) report two 
experiments comparing how well individuals with high vs. low working memory 
                                                
12 Note that this is merely informed speculation. Leslie, Khemlani and Glucksberg (2011) do not 
provide details about the duration of the experiment, or report any kind of variance in performance 




capacity (as assessed by the Reading Span test) are able to read and comprehend 
subject vs. object relative clause containing sentences under conditions of varying 
concurrent working memory load.13 Using a moving-window self-paced reading 
paradigm (Just, Carpenter, and Wooley 1982), and a working memory load 
manipulation in which subjects had to recall 0, 1 or 2 cued words from the sentence(s) 
they read, King and Just found that all three manipulations (sentence type, number of 
words to recall, and participant working memory span) affected recall rates, 
comprehension question accuracy and reading times. It is not necessary for present 
purposes to discuss the details of all the main effects and interactions, or their 
interpretations, but, it is worth noting that King and Just found that for High Span 
participants, comprehension accuracy for object relatives declined 10% as the recall 
load increased from 0 to 2, but there was no decline in their accuracy for the easier 
subject relatives. 
Thus, in an experiment with a much more demanding basic task (moving-
window self-paced reading, followed by complex comprehension questions), and 
linguistic materials, where even the ‘easy’ subject relatives condition is considerably 
more complex than the 3-5 word sentences in Leslie, Khemlani, and Glucksberg’s  
(2011) experiment 1 (compare: The reporter that attacked the senator admitted the 
error publicly after the hearing with All ducks lay eggs), King and Just find only a 
10% increase in error rates associated with an increasingly demanding concurrent 
cognitive task, only for object relative clauses. And even then, the overall error rates 
only reached about 20%. 
Seen in this context, Leslie and colleagues’ explanation for experiment 1, 
whereby 78% of the time their participants erroneously judged statements like all 
tigers have stripes to be true because of high cognitive load is untenable. 
 Furthermore, the only experiment we are aware of that actually manipulates 
task demands in the processing of generics is Meyer, Gelman and Stilwell (2011). The 
rationale behind their experiment was that if generics are default, it should be easier to 
judge that a property is characteristic of a generic (i.e. dogs) than of a quantified set 
(i.e. all dogs) and they expected this generic advantage when participants were under 
time pressure.  Meyer et al. recorded truth value judgments and judgment times in 
response to majority characteristic generic vs. all quantified statements like {all} dogs 
have four legs and definitional statements like {all} giraffes have long necks, and 
varied whether participants were told to answer as quickly as possible, or to take as 
much time as they wanted. 
The main results were that a) participants in the speeded condition were more 
accurate at making a truth value judgment (90% for generics vs. 55% for quantified 
statements) and faster to respond to generics (~900ms) than to universals (~1100ms) 
and b) for definitional statements, participants were faster to respond to generics than 
universals in both the speeded (~900ms vs. ~1000ms) and the unspeeded (~1400ms 
vs. ~1800ms) condition. Both results seem to be consistent with the GaD hypothesis: 
participants were, indeed, more likely to say ‘true’ to all dogs have four legs in the 
speeded condition than in the non-speeded condition, and were slower to judge 
quantified than generic statements, which suggests quantification is effortful, and 
                                                
13 Object relative clauses have been long known to be more effortful to process than matched subject 
relatives (Holmes and O’Regan 1981), and this difference is typically taken to reflect the increased 
processing demands of retaining the wh-dependency in working memory longer in object relatives 
(compare: subject relative: The author who [t knew the editor] met her friend. vs. object relative: The 




participants were more susceptible to a GOG error when they were under time 
pressure.  
But these results merit a closer look. In the unspeeded condition, participants 
were numerically, though not statistically, less accurate at judging the truth of generic 
majority characteristic statements than in the speeded condition (85% vs. 90%), while 
they were significantly more accurate for quantified statements (80% vs. 55%). The 
difference between the ‘error’ rate for the majority characteristic quantified 
statements between the speeded and unspeeded conditions is about 35% - a rather 
large effect for a relatively minor cognitive demand increase, but still nowhere near 
the 78% error rate found by Leslie, Khemlani, and Glucksberg’s (2011) experiment 1, 
which imposed no time pressure or other high-load demands on participants. 
These results then, suggest that while it is indeed possible to increase the truth 
value judgment error rate for at least the majority characteristic quantified statements 
by increasing task demands, processing load is unlikely to come close to accounting 
for the GOG effects reported in the literature. 
We propose, instead, that most of the time, an apparently GOG response is not, 
in fact, a processing error at all. We argue that mechanisms for which we have 
independent motivation can account for these kinds of responses, i.e. Quantifier 
Domain Restriction, as well as subkind (taxonomic) interpretation and the semantic 
and pragmatic ambiguity of all. And Leslie, Khemlani, and Glucksberg (2011) 
themselves find that ignorance of, or failure to recall, the facts can account for 18% of 
GOG responses. Thus, evidence that the GOG responses are erroneous judgments is 




We observed that there is both a long-established interest in the study of generic 
statements in the formal semantics literature, and a relatively recent surge in research 
on genericity from a psychological perspective. These views seem to take 
categorically different stances on genericity, as the formal semantics view treats 
generics as quantificational and the GaD view treats generics as categorically 
different from quantifiers (though exactly what this view entails requires further 
clarification). Nevertheless, each approach offers an explanation for important 
phenomena (relating to the interpretation of generics and the pattern of acquisition, 
among others) and each faces its own challenges. The main case that we focussed 
upon in this paper is the evidence from adult processing data that has come to light 
thanks to the intense psycholinguistic interest in genericity. We reviewed existing 
experimental evidence, outlined possible future experimental directions and 
concluded that a closer look at the semantics and pragmatics of generic and 
universally quantified statements, as well as a more careful consideration of the 
potential effects of processing demands, may provide a more nuanced explanation for 
the pattern of adult judgments than that proposed by the psychological GaD view.  
We suggested that even the name of the GOG effect might be misleading. The 
effect mainly tries to capture the behaviour observed with the quantifier all, which 
supposedly gets a generic interpretation as a result of an overgeneralisation bias. 
Thus, perhaps a better name for that effect would be ‘Quantifier Reanalysis’ effect, 
because this term would direct the focus where we believe it belongs: on the 





Ultimately, we believe that by integrating the tools and perspectives of both 
strands of investigation, we can gain a better understanding of what generic 
generalisations are, how they differ from quantificational generalisations and what the 
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